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Pricing for Local and Global WiFi Markets
Lingjie Duan, Member, IEEE, Jianwei Huang, Senior Member, IEEE, and Biying Shou
Abstract—This paper analyzes two pricing schemes commonly used in WiFi markets: the flat-rate and the usage-based pricing. The
flat-rate pricing encourages the maximum usage, while the usage-based pricing can flexibly attract more users especially those with
low valuations in mobile Internet access. First, we use theoretical analysis to compare the two schemes and show that for a single
provider in a market, as long as the WiFi capacity is abundant, the flat-rate pricing leads to more revenue. Second, we study how a
global provider (e.g., Skype) collaborates with this monopolist in each local market to provide a global WiFi service. We formulate the
interactions between the global and local providers as a dynamic game. In Stage I, the global provider bargains with the local provider
in each market to determine the global WiFi service price and revenue sharing agreement. In Stage II, local users and travelers choose
local or global WiFi services. We analytically show that the global provider prefers to use the usage-based pricing to avoid a severe
competition with the local provider. At the equilibrium, the global provider always shares the majority of his revenue with the local
provider to incentivize the cooperation. Finally, we analytically study how the interaction changes if the local market has more than
one local provider. In this case, the global provider can integrate the coverages of multiple local providers and provide a better service.
Compared to the local monopoly case, local market competition enables the global provider to share less revenue with each of the
local providers. However, we numerically show that the global provider’s revenue could decrease, as he shares his revenue with more
providers and can only charge a lower price.
Index Terms—WiFi markets, Flat-rate pricing, Usage-based pricing, Nash bargaining, Collaboration and competition
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
The 802.11 standard based wireless local area network
technology, also known as WiFi, is one of the most suc-
cessful stories in modern wireless communications [2].
Operating in the unlicensed 2.4GHz and 5GHz spectrum
band, WiFi networks do not require exclusive spectrum
licenses as their cellular counterparts, and can provide
high-speed wireless access to mobile users within tens
to hundreds of meters of WiFi access points (APs) [3].
Furthermore, APs in WiFi networks are inexpensive and
can be easily deployed and maintained [4]. These explain
why the annual revenue in the WiFi industry is growing
rapidly in recent years and is expected to worth $93.23
billion by 2018 (e.g., [5], [7]).
In order to provide close to seamless high perfor-
mance mobile communication experiences, many WiFi
providers (e.g., AT&T in US, BT Openzone in UK, iPass
in some EU countries, and PCCW in Hong Kong) are
deploying a large number of WiFi APs in their local mar-
kets. For example, iPass has set up more than 1.2 million
public WiFi venues, and his revenue keeps growing 14
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percent quarter-over-quarter (reaching $20.3 milllion in
the second quarter of 2013) [6]. In the Hong Kong market
alone, PCCW has increasingly rolled out more than
twelve thousand public APs covering almost all popu-
lar places (e.g., convenient stores and shopping malls,
coffee shops and hotels, train stations, and education
institutes). Note that some of these providers (e.g., AT&T
and PCCW) are also cellular operators; however, they
provide the WiFi services separately from their cellular
data plans to cater to mobile devices without intrinsic
cellular connectivity (e.g., tablets and laptops) as well as
users who are not their current cellular subscribers (but
are willing to use their WiFi services). Generally, cellular
data services and WiFi services target at different users:
one supporting high user mobility and the other sup-
porting high data throughput. For many local providers,
we often observe them charging local users (subscribers) a
monthly flat fee (e.g., [8]–[10]), where a user pays a fixed
amount per month independent of the actual usage. This
motivates us to ask the first key question in this paper:
Why does a local WiFi provider prefer to charge his local users
a flat fee instead of a usage-based fee?
Notice that a WiFi AP can serve not only local users,
but also travelers who visit a particular city/country for
a short period of time. But paying a monthly flat fee is
often not a good choice for a traveler. To cater to the
needs of travelers, Skype has pioneered in providing a
global WiFi service under the band name of Skype WiFi,
through collaborating with many local WiFi providers
who own a total of more than 1 million WiFi APs
worldwide [11]. Once a user subscribes to the Skype
WiFi service, he can use any of the associated WiFi AP
with his Skype account, and pays according to usage
with his Skype Credit (i.e., “only pays for the time you
2are online”, as Skype puts it). Such flexible Skype WiFi
service provides great convenience for travelers, but also
introduces competition with local WiFi providers among
local users. In order to promote such cooperation, Skype
needs to share part of the revenue with the local WiFi
providers who provide the physical WiFi APs. Thus, the
local WiFi providers will have incentives to collaborate
with Skype and share their infrastructure only if they
can also gain from this new service. This motivates us
to ask the second key question in this paper: Why does a
global provider choose usage-based pricing for his global WiFi
service, and how should he share the benefits with the local
WiFi providers?
To answer the first key question, we focus on a local
market with a monopolistic local WiFi provider and a
group of local users. We model their interactions as a
two-stage Stackelberg game: the local provider (leader)
determines pricing scheme (flat-fee or usage-based) in
Stage I, and local users (followers) decide whether they
will subscribe to the service (and how much to use) in
Stage II. We show that the flat-fee pricing can offer a
higher revenue than the usage-based pricing for such
a monopolistic local provider. To answer the second
key question, we study how the global provider may
provide a global WiFi service by cooperating with local
providers, given the local providers’ optimal flat-fee
based pricing. We formulate the problem as a two-
stage dynamic game. In Stage I, the global provider
negotiates with each local provider about the global WiFi
price and the revenue sharing portion based on Nash
bargaining. In Stage II, local users choose between the
global and local providers’ services, and travelers choose
their usage levels in the global WiFi service.
Our key results and contributions are as follows:
• Flat-fee pricing dominates the local WiFi markets: In
Sections 2, 3 and 4, we study the price choices of
a monopolistic local provider. We analytically show
that the flat-rate pricing is effective in attracting the
high-valuation users, while the usage-based pricing
is attractive to the low-valuation ones. When the
WiFi capacity is abundant, the local provider will
choose the flat-fee pricing as it brings more revenue.
• Win-win situation when the global provider chooses
the usage-based pricing: In Section 5, we analytically
show that the global WiFi provider prefers the
usage-based pricing, in order to avoid severe com-
petition with local providers. Such pricing scheme
also attracts those not served by local providers
(e.g., local users with low-valuations and travel-
ers from other markets), and hence increases the
total revenue in the market. When the revenue is
shared properly, the global provider and each local
provider achieve a win-win situation.
• Nash bargaining on the global WiFi price and revenue
sharing: In Section 6, we decompose the interac-
tions among different local markets and study each
of them separately. We analytically show that the
global provider always needs to share the majority
of his revenue with local providers, to compensate
the providers’ revenue loss due to competitions
and incentivize them to share the infrastructure. If
the local user population decreases or the traveler
population from other markets increases, the global
provider has a larger bargaining power and gives
away less revenue .
• Impact of local market competition: In Section 7, we
extend the analysis in the monopolistic local market
to a competitive market. We analytically show that
the local provider competition reduces the market
price and attracts more users. The competition pro-
vides more incentives for local providers to col-
laborate with the global provider, and enables the
global provider to share less revenue with each
provider. However, we numerically show that the
global provider’s revenue could decrease, as he can
only charge a lower price and will share revenue
with more providers.
1.1 Related Work
The recent literature on WiFi pricing can be divided into
three categories. The first category focuses on how a
local provider optimizes the price or multiple providers
compete on their prices to maximize individual revenues
(e.g., [14], [15], [23]). These results often ignored the
WiFi’s limited coverage and the users’ movements across
different WiFi markets. Moreover, they often assumed
either flat-rate pricing or usage-based pricing, without
an analytical comparison between the two schemes.1
The second category focused on the perspective of an
individual WiFi AP owner, who charges visitors for
using his AP’s resources (e.g., [17]–[19]). The key de-
sign challenge here is the asymmetric information, i.e.,
visitors know more about their own utility functions
than the AP owner. The third category studied wireless
social community networks, where WiFi owners form a
community to share their APs with each other, so that
one AP owner can use other APs to access the Internet
during travel (e.g., [4], [20]). In this line of literature,
the main design objective is to encourage as many AP
owners to join the community as possible. The revenue
maximization becomes a secondary concern.
In this paper, we study the optimal pricing schemes in
both local and global WiFi markets. We consider several
key and practical features of WiFi networks (e.g., WiFi’s
limited coverage and users’ movement across different
WiFi markets), and compare the pros and cons of the
flat-rate and the usage-based pricing. Furthermore, we
are the first to study how a global WiFi service provider
(such as Skype) may cooperate with local providers,
negotiate pricing and revenue sharing schemes, and
achieve a win-win situation.
There are some other works studying how a monopoly
provider uses a supplementary network technology to
1. Although Lee et al. [16] considered various pricing schemes, the
proposed usage-based pricing does not apply to our WiFi services.
3improve the existing one (e.g., using WiFi networks
to offload heavy data traffic from cellular networks to
avoid congestion) (e.g., [21], [22]). Unlike those studies,
our study focuses on the public WiFi service market,
and tries to understand the issue of service pricing and
collaboration/competitoin locally and globally.
1.2 Taxonomy
The following terms will be used throughout this paper.
• Local provider: A WiFi provider who deploys APs
to provide service to a single region. For example,
PCCW serves the Hong Kong market only, and
AT&T serves the USA market only.
• Global provider: A WiFi provider who serves multiple
local markets, by using the network infrastructure
(APs) of the corresponding local providers. For ex-
ample, the Skype WiFi service covers many coun-
tries with collaborations with local provides, but
Skype does not own any physical WiFi APs.
• Local market: A market that is served by one or
multiple local providers (and possibly by a global
provider). There are a set I = {1, 2, ..., I} of disjoint
local markets. Initially we will assume that each
local market has a single local provider. In Section 7,
we will further look at the case where there are
multiple local providers in the same market.
• Local user: A user who lives in a particular local
market as a long-term resident. There are Ni local
users in each local market i ∈ I.
• Traveler: When a user travels to a market other than
his own local market, he becomes a traveler. We use
the parameter αij ∈ [0, 1] to denote the percentage
of users in a local market j who are willing to pay
short-term visits to local market i, and thus the total
travelers from market j to i is αijNj .
2 USAGE-BASED PRICING FOR LOCAL WIFI
We will first study how a local provider in a local market
i optimizes the price to maximize the revenue, assuming
that he chooses the usage-based pricing. In Section 3,
we will derive the optimal pricing term should the local
provider choose to use the flat-fee pricing. In Section 4,
we will compare these two cases, and show that flat-
fee pricing always brings more revenue than the usage-
based pricing in the local WiFi service.
We consider a two-stage dynamic game between a
local provider i and a group of Ni local users. In Stage
I, the provider i announces the price pi (per unit of
usage time) to maximize his revenue. In Stage II, users
decide whether and how much to use the service to
maximize their payoffs. As there are two stages in this
game and the provider is the only leader (followed by
users), this is also a Stackelberg game. At a Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium (SPE, or simply equilibrium) of the
game, the provider and users will not have incentives to
change their pricing and usage choices.
Next we will analyze the equilibrium of the game
using the backward induction [24]. We will first study
the users’ decisions in Stage II for any given price,
and then look at how the provider should optimize
the price in Stage I by taking the users’ decisions into
consideration.
2.1 Stage II: Users’ Usage Choices
Due to the limited number of APs, a local WiFi provider
typically cannot provide a complete coverage in a re-
gion. Let us denote the local provider’s WiFi’s cover-
age as Gi(Mi) ∈ (0, 1), where Mi is the total num-
ber of deployed APs. In this paper, we will assume
that Mi is fixed, and thus will simply write Gi(Mi)
as Gi. Notice that today’s WiFi technologies support
high data throughput and the coming WiFi technology
IEEE 802.11ac further offers a much larger throughput
(up to 866.7 Mbit/s) per user [12]. Hence, the network
congestion is usually not a major issue in such WiFi
networks. Furthermore, the FCC has decided to dramat-
ically expand the unlicensed spectrum for use by WiFi
devices and hence will effectively mitigate possible WiFi
congestion in the near future [13]. Note that the WiFi
deployment cost is fixed and is related to Gi, and the
optimal pricing decisions are not affected by the cost, as
long as the maximum revenue can compensate the cost.
When a local user in market i is in the WiFi coverage,
we denote his usage level as d ∈ [0, 1], which repre-
sents the percentage of Internet connection time over
the whole time in WiFi coverage.2 For example, d = 1
means that the user always stays online whenever WiFi
is available. Different users may demand different usage
levels as they have different valuations towards Internet
connection. We characterize such a valuation by a type
parameter θ. Unlike d, the parameter θ is not a decision
variable. A larger θ implies the user’s higher valuation of
the Internet access time. Like many other studies in this
field, we assume that θ follows a uniform distribution
in [0, 1] for analysis tractability and the relaxation to
more general distributions is unlikely to change the main
engineering insights (e.g., [16], [17], [25]). We further
assume that a type-θ user’s utility u(θ, d) is linearly in-
creasing in θ and concavely increasing in d. The concav-
ity assumption is to represent his diminishing return in
Internet access time. One commonly used utility function
satisfying our requirement is3
u(θ, d) = θ ln(1 + kd), (1)
where the parameter k > 0 represents the elasticity of
demand, i.e., the ratio between the percent change of
demand and the percent change of price [28]. In eco-
nomics and marketing, the usual way to obtain the value
2. We assume that mobile users’ time-varying locations follow Pois-
son point process (PPP), and thus each user has the same expected total
time (normlized by Gi) within the WiFi coverage during a period of
time (e.g., one month). Each user’s total WiFi actual connected time is
hence Gi if the demand level d = 1.
3. The logarithmic utility is widely used in the networking literature
to model elastic applications (e.g., [26], [27]).
4of k is through extensive market survey and statistical
analysis [29]. As it is difficult and costly to track each
user’s demand elasticity, it is common to examine users’
aggregate behavior and use an identical k for all users to
represent the average elasticity. Unlike k, it is relatively
easy to estimate the distribution of willingness to pay
(i.e., θ) in marketing.
When using the service, a user needs to pay linearly
proportionally to his usage time and the unit price pi.
This is motivated by the fact that many providers charge
based on connection time instead of data volume. As the
user’s usage and payment are only meaningful when he
is within the WiFi coverage, his overall payoff vi is linear
in the coverage Gi,
4
vi(θ, pi, d) = Gi(θ ln(1 + kd)− pid). (2)
Maximizing payoff vi over d leads to the optimal usage
level
d∗(θ, pi) = min
(
max
(
θ
pi
− 1
k
, 0
)
, 1
)
, (3)
which is increasing in the user’s indivisual type θ (and
the common elasticity parameter k), and is decreasing
in price pi. Furthermore, only users with θ ≥ pi/k will
have a positive usage (i.e., subscribe to the service).
Next we exploit how users’ optimal usage levels
change with the price pi. By assuming that the two terms
in the min operation in (3) are equal at θ = 1, we can
derive the following price threshold:
pthi =
k
k + 1
. (4)
When the price pi is less than pthi , some high valuation
users will choose d(θ, pi) = 1. Otherwise, all users will
request a usage level less than 1 (can be zero if θ is very
small). We will discuss these two scenarios in Stage I.
2.2 Stage I: The Local Provider’s Pricing Choice
2.2.1 Low price regime: pi < k/(k + 1)
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Fig. 1. Users’ WiFi usage choices in the low price regime
Figure 1 summarizes users’ optimal usage levels in
this case. There are three categories of users based on the
type parameter θ: (i) a user with a small type θ ∈ [0, pi/k)
will not subscribe to the WiFi service, (ii) a user with a
medium type θ ∈ [pi/k, pi(1 + k)/k) will subscribe with
a partial usage level (i.e., d∗(θ, pi) = θ/pi− 1/k < 1), and
(iii) a user with a high type θ ∈ [pi(1 + k)/k, 1] will have
4. A mobile user will start to consider his network usage level d after
detecting the WiFi signal (i.e., inside the coverage of Gi) from time to
time, and will not decide a total usage level Gid beforehand. Thus we
model the user’s utility as Giθ ln(1+ kd) in (2), where the linear term
Gi can be view viewed as the time frequency to use d.
the maximum usage (i.e., d∗(θ, pi) = 1). The provider’s
total revenue collected from the latter two user categories
is
pii(pi) = NiGipi
(∫ pi(k+1)
k
pi
k
(
θ
pi
− 1
k
)
dθ +
∫ 1
pi(k+1)
k
1dθ
)
= NiGi
(
pi − p2i
(
1
2
+
1
k
))
. (5)
By checking the first and second order derivatives of
pii(pi), we can show that pii(pi) is concave in pi. Thus
the optimal price that maximizes the revenue in the low
price regime is
pLi =
k
k + 2
. (6)
The provider’s maximum revenue in the low price
regime is
pii(p
L
i ) = NiGi
k
2(k + 2)
. (7)
2.2.2 High price regime: pi ≥ k/(k + 1)
!
1
2
0 1ip
k
"#$%&#'!()#*+!
!
,-!)(.)/$&"%&-,!
Fig. 2. Users’ WiFi usage choices in the high price regime
Figure 2 summarizes users’ optimal usage in this case.
There are two categories of users under such a price: (i) a
user with a low type θ ∈ [0, pi/k)will not subscribe to the
WiFi service, and (ii) a user with a high type θ ∈ [pi/k, 1]
chooses to subscribe the WiFi service with a partial usage
level (i.e., d∗(θ, pi) = θ/pi−1/k < 1). The provider’s total
revenue collected from the second user category is
pii(pi) = NiGipi
∫ 1
pi
k
(
θ
pi
− 1
k
)
dθ = NiGi
(
1
2
− pi
k
+
p2i
2k2
)
.
(8)
The first order derivative of (8) over pi is
dpii(pi)
dpi
= NiGi
pi − k
k2
. (9)
Notice that to obtain a positive revenue, the provider
should set the price such that the highest type user is
willing to subscribe, i.e., d∗(1, pi) = 1/pi− 1/ki > 0. This
means pi < k, which implies (9) is negative. Thus the
optimal price in the high price regime is
pHi =
k
k + 1
,
which is the boundary case of the low price regime.
Summarizing the results from both price regimes, we
have the following result.
Proposition 1: The provider’s equilibrium usage-based
price that maximizes his revenue is
p∗i =
k
k + 2
, (10)
5which is increasing in the elasticity parameter of demand
k and is independent of coverage Gi. The provider’s
maximum revenue under the equilibrium usage-based
pricing is
pii(p
∗
i ) = NiGi
k
2(k + 2)
. (11)
The independence of p∗i in Gi is due to the fact that
a user only pays when he uses the service in the WiFi
coverage area.
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Fig. 3. Users’ WiFi usage choices at the equilibrium
usage-based pricing
Figure 3 summarizes all users’ usage behaviors at
the equilibrium. The flexibility of usage-based pricing
attracts the majority of users to the service, since the
threshold type p∗i /k = 1/(k + 2) < 1/2. As the elasticity
parameter k increases, the type threshold will decrease
and more users will join the service. Users’ total usage
level, however, is
Di(p
∗
i ) = NiGi

∫ p
∗
i
(1+k)
k
p∗
i
k
(
θ
p∗i
− 1
k
)
dθ +
∫ 1
p∗
i
(1+k)
k
1dθ


= NiGi/2, (12)
which is independent of k.
3 FLAT-RATE PRICING FOR LOCAL WIFI
Similar to Section 2, in this section we also consider
a two-stage Stackelberg game played by the provider
i and Ni users. The difference is that the provider
will announce a flat-fee in Stage I, and users decide
whether to subscribe to the service in Stage II. Since
a user’s payment is independent of his usage level, he
will always choose the maximum usage time d = 1 (i.e.,
stay online whenever the user is in the WiFi coverage
area) whenever he subscribes. Next we derive the game
equilibrium by using the backward induction.
3.1 Stage II: Users’ Subscription Choices
In Stage II, by joining the flat-rate price plan, a type-θ
user’s payoff is
vi(θ, Pi) = Giu(θ, 1)− Pi = Giθ ln(1 + k)− Pi. (13)
Notice that the flat fee Pi is independent of usage, and
thus is also independent of whether the user is in the
WiFi coverage area. In other words, once a user sub-
scribes to the WiFi service, he will be charged a flat fee at
the end of that month. This means that the effective price
considering the limited coverage is P˜i := Pi/Gi > Pi.
It is clear that only users who have high valuations
of mobile Internet access would subscribe to the WiFi
service and obtain a positive payoff. The minimum type
parameter θ among the “active” users is
θth(Pi) =
Pi
Gi ln(1 + k)
. (14)
3.2 Stage I: The Local Provider’s Pricing Choice
In Stage I, the provider wants to maximize his revenue
by collecting payment from users with θ ∈ [θth(Pi), 1],
i.e.,
max
Pi≥0
pii(Pi) = NiPi
(
1− Pi
Gi ln(1 + k)
)
. (15)
It is easy to verify that pii(Pi) is concave in Pi, and we
can derive the optimal price as follows.
Proposition 2: The provider’s equilibrium flat-rate
price that maximizes his revenue is
P ∗i = Gi ln(1 + k)/2, (16)
which is increasing in the coverage Gi and elasticity
parameter k. The provider’s maximum revenue with the
equilibrium flat fee is
pii(P
∗
i ) =
Ni
4
Gi ln(1 + k), (17)
which is increasing in Gi and k.
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Fig. 4. Users’ WiFi usage choices at the equilibrium flat-
fee pricing
Figure 4 summarizes users’ usage behaviors at the
equilibrium. Comparing with Figure 3, the inflexibility
of the flat-fee pricing scheme attracts fewer users (1/2
instead of (k+1)/(k+2)) than the usage-based scheme.
Intuitively, a better WiFi coverage and a larger elas-
ticity parameter encourage more users to join the WiFi
service, and the provider can charge more. Users’ total
usage is
Di(P
∗
i ) =
Ni
2
Gi, (18)
which is the same as in the usage-based pricing case in
(12). This is because users consume more (on average)
with the flat-fee pricing.
4 FLAT-RATE OUTPERFORMS USAGE-BASED
PRICING FOR LOCAL WIFI SERVICE
Now we are ready to compare the two pricing schemes
and see which one leads to a larger provider revenue.
Let us define the ratio between the equilibrium rev-
enues of the flat-rate pricing scheme and the usage-based
pricing scheme as r := pii(P ∗i )/pii(p
∗
i ). Based on (11) and
(17), we can rewrite the ratio as a function of k, i.e.,
r(k) =
(k + 2) ln(1 + k)
2k
. (19)
6The first order derivative of r(k) over k is
dr(k)
dk
=
k(k + 2)/(k + 1)− 2 ln(1 + k)
2k2
, (20)
and we can show that such a derivative is positive for all
positive values of k. Using L’Hospital law, we can show
that
lim
k→0
r(k) =
ln(1 + k) + (k + 2)/(k + 1)
2
∣∣∣∣
k=0
= 1.
This means that r(k) > 1 for any k > 0. Thus, we have
the following result.
Theorem 1: A local provider can obtain a larger rev-
enue with the flat-rate pricing than with the usage-
based pricing. The revenue gap increases in the elasticity
parameter k.
Theorem 1 is consistent with the current industry prac-
tice, where most WiFi providers offer flat-rate pricing
instead of usage-based pricing in local markets (e.g.,
Orange in UK [9], AT&T in US [10], and PCCW in Hong
Kong [8]). Another benefit of the flat-rate pricing (that is
not explicitly modeled here) is that it is easy to imple-
ment with little overhead for billing, while the usage-
based pricing requires the provider to record users’
mobile traffic for payment calculation and collection over
time [30].
4.1 Impact of WiFi Congestion
When a large number of users try to access the same
WiFi network, they may experience network congestion,
which will reduce some of their interests to join the local
WiFi service. In the following, we take the congestion
into account in our local WiFi model and evaluate the
impact of congestion on the pricing choice. Let us denote
the WiFi congestion coefficient c(B), which is related
to the WiFi bandwidth B and models the congestion
cost for one unit of WiFi demand. We also denote the
minimum type parameter θ among the WiFi subscribers
as θth, and users with θ ∈ [θth, 1] will subscribe.
4.1.1 Usage-based pricing under congestion
We first analyze users’ best decisions in Stage II and then
solve the provider’s problem in Stage I by predicting
users’ best responses. By incorporating the congestion
cost into (2), the payoff of a user with θ ≥ θth by
demanding a usage level d is
vi(θ, pi, d) = Gi(θ ln(1+ kd)− pid− cNi
∫ 1
θth
d∗(θ′, pi)dθ
′),
(21)
where d∗(θ′, pi) is the optimal demand of user type-θ′.
As each WiFi subscriber is infinitesimal (non-atomic) in
contributing to the congestion term in (21), his optimal
demand (as long as his payoff is non-negative) is not
affected by the congestion and is the same as (3). That
is, d∗(θ, pi) = min(max(θ/pi−1/k, 0), 1). As the user with
type θ = θth is indifferent in choosing between WiFi and
not, his normalized optimal payoff by Gi is zero. Thus,
we can derive the unique solution θth according to the
following equation:
vi∗(θth, pi)/Gi = θth ln
(
1 + kmin
(
max
(
θth
pi
−
1
k
, 0
)
, 1
))
− pimin
(
max
(
θth
pi
−
1
k
, 0
)
, 1
)
− cNi
∫ 1
θth
d∗(θ′, pi)dθ
′ = 0,
(22)
We can see that θth here becomes larger because of
congestion, and fewer users will subscribe. As θth de-
pends on the service price pi, we rewrite it as θth(pi).
By predicting this, the provider’s revenue-maximization
problem is
max
pi
pi(pi) = piNiGi
∫ 1
θth(pi)
min
(
max
(
θ
pi
− 1
k
, 0
)
, 1
)
dθ.
(23)
We can show that Problem (23) has no closed-form
solution, but can be solved efficiently and numerically
through an one-dimensional exhaustive search about
price pi.
4.1.2 Flat-rate pricing under congestion
AWiFi subscriber does not care about his contribution to
the congestion and it is still optimal for him to demand
a full usage level (d = 1). Under network congestion, a
type-θ user’s payoff is changed from (13) to
vi(θ, Pi) = Gi
(
θ ln(1 + k)− cNi
∫ 1
θth
1dθ
)
− Pi, (24)
which is zero for the indifferent user with θ = θth. Then
user partition threshold for subscription is
θth(Pi) =
Pi/Gi + cNi
ln(1 + k) + cNi
,
which depends on the flat-rate price Pi and is larger
than (14) due to congestion. In Stage I, the provider’s
optimization problem is
max
Pi
pii(Pi) = PiNi
(
1− Pi/Gi + cNi
ln(1 + k) + cNi
)
,
which is a concave function in Pi and its optimal solution
P ∗i = Gi ln(1 + k)/2. This is the same as (16) and is
independent of congestion level. The resultant revenue
is
pii(P
∗
i ) =
NiGi ln(1 + k)
4(1 + cNi/ ln(1 + k))
, (25)
which is decreasing in congestion coefficient c.
Now we are ready to compare the provider’s optimal
revenue under the two pricing schemes. As there is
no closed-form solution to Problem (23), we rely on
numerical results. Figure 5 shows the provider’s optimal
revenue ratio pii(p∗i )/pii(P
∗
i ) between usage-based and
flat-rate pricing. As the congestion coefficient c increases
or the local user population Ni increases, the network
congestion in the WiFi servcie increases and flat-rate
pricing (not adaptive to congestion level) will eventually
lose its advantage over the usage-based pricing.
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Fig. 5. The optimal profit ratio pii(p∗i )/pii(P ∗i ) between
usage-based and flat-rate pricing
5 GLOBAL WIFI SERVICE
Now let us look at the WiFi service in a global market by
investigating the fact of Skype’s global WiFi operation. If
one company wants to provide a global WiFi service, he
can either densely deploy APs worldwide or cooperate
with many local WiFi providers. The former approach
typically requires an extremely large investment, while
the latter approach is more feasible. In fact, today a
global provider (e.g., Skype) uses the latter approach
to provide a global WiFi service called “Skype WiFi”,
which involves more than 1 million APs deployed by
many local providers worldwide (e.g., Best Western in
US, BT Openzone in UK, and PCCW in Hong Kong).
To motivate the cooperation of local providers, Skype
shares some of his WiFi revenue with these cooperators
[31]. Here is what each side will gain and lose during
this cooperation.
• Skype’s gain: Skype can gain extra revenue by pro-
viding WiFi service. Skype used to be just a software
provider without any physical WiFi infrastructure.
With the cooperation and a usage-based pricing,
Skype is able to serve travelers who are not willing
to sign a long-term contract with local providers.
Furthermore, Skype can attract some low-valuation
local users who do not subscribe to the flat-fee local
WiFi service, or prefer usage-based pricing to the
flat-fee pricing. During this process, Skype needs
to share part of the revenue with the local WiFi
providers to achieve a win-win situation.
• Local provider’s benefit and loss: When Skype starts to
provide WiFi service in a local market i, the local
provider i will experience new market competition
and a reduced number of subscribers. However,
as Skype relies on the local provider’s WiFi in-
frastructure, the provider has the market power to
negotiate with Skype on Skype WiFi’s price to avoid
severe competition.5 Furthermore, he can share part
of the Skype’s revenue to compensate his loss and
potentially increase his total revenue.
The slogan of Skype WiFi is “only pay for the time
you’re online” (usage-based pricing). Note that Skype
has the following three advantages over many local
providers to implement a usage-based pricing.
• Existing mechanism to record users’ traffic: Skype can
use the same traffic recording system in Skype WiFi
as in the existing Skype Internet Call Service.
• Trustworthy global billing system: Skype has built a
reputable global billing platform with his existing
services. As Skype has successfully cooperated with
many local telecommunication companies on offer-
ing the Skype Internet Call Service, it is easy for
Skype to convince local WiFi providers to be new
collaborators.
• High market penetration and brand visibility: Skype has
a more than 600 million users and can easily ad-
vertise the Skype WiFi service globally, while many
local providers have little brand visibility outside
their local markets.
Even with these advantages, one may still wonder
why Skype does not choose the flat-fee pricing, as what
the local providers are doing for local WiFi services. Our
analysis shows that one key reason is for Skype to avoid
severe competition with local providers in order to reach
a win-win situation.
To make the discussion more concrete, let us first look
at the users’ choices. After Skype’s entry, a user in his
own local market can choose between the local WiFi
service and Skype WiFi service. When the user travels
to a different market, he will only choose Skype WiFi as
he does not want to pay a monthly flat fee in a different
market.
Now consider the possibility of Skype adopting the
flat-rate pricing scheme for the global WiFi service. This
can further include two variations: a market-dependent
flat-rate pricing and a market-independent one. In the
market-dependent scheme, a user needs to pay a sep-
arate flat-rate price for each market (either local or
foreign) he might enter. In this way, Skype WiFi is just
replicating many local services at a global scale. This
leads to direct competition with local providers in each
local market (e.g., all local users in a market will choose
Skype WiFi if his flat-fee is lower than the corresponding
local provider’s price). Furthermore, such a scheme is
not attractive to a user who travels in many markets,
as more markets means a higher total payment. In the
market-independent scheme, a user subscribing to Skype
WiFi only needs to pay a single flat fee to receive services
in all markets. Then many users no longer need to
use the local WiFi service. To summarize, in each of
5. For simplicity, we assume that a local provider i will still charge
the same flat fee P ∗i in (16) after Skype’s entry. In practice, a local
provider may not be able to change the flat-rate price very often due
to the reputation issue [26].
8the two cases, the local WiFi provider will suffer from
Skype’s flat-fee pricing, and will not have the incentive
to cooperate. This can explain why in practice Skype
chooses the usage-based pricing scheme.
6 OPTIMAL USAGE-BASED PRICING SCHEME
FOR GLOBAL WIFI PROVIDER
Now we will analyze the optimal usage-based pricing
scheme for the global WiFi provider. We will consider the
market-dependent usage-based pricing scheme (which
is Skype’s current practice), where a user pays different
usage-based prices when he is in different markets.The
market-independent usage based pricing is a special case
of the market-dependent one. Under such a scheme, we
can model the interactions between the global provider,
a local provider i, and local users as well as travelers
in market i as a two-stage dynamic game. In Stage I,
the global provider and (the local) provider i jointly
decide the global WiFi usage-based price pGlobi and the
revenue sharing portion ηi (as a compensation of using
provider i’s network infrastructure). In Stage II, each of
the Ni local users chooses between the global provider’s
WiFi and the provider i’s local service (and the usage
level if choosing global WiFi), and travelers decide their
usages of the global WiFi service. As there is more than
one leader (the global and local providers) in Stage I,
this game is no longer a Stackelber game but a two-
stage dynamic game. In the following, we use backward
induction to examine Stage II first.
6.1 Stage II: Local Users’ and Travelers’ choices
Consider a total of I markets in the global market. A
type-θ local user in the local market i has two types of
demands:
• Demand in his local market: he can choose global
WiFi’s usage-based price (with the optimal us-
age d∗(θ, pGlobi ) as in (3)) or provider i’s flat-rate
price P ∗i in (16) (with the optimal maximum usage
d∗(θ, P ∗i ) = 1).
• Demand when he travels in non-local markets: he will
only choose global WiFi’s usage-based prices in
other I − 1 markets. The probability for this user
traveling to a market j is αji < 1. By demanding
a usage level d∗(θ, pGlobj ) in market j as in (3), this
user’s aggregate payoff in all non-local markets is∑
j 6=i
αjiGj
(
u
(
θ, d∗(θ, pGlobj )
)− pGlobj d∗(θ, pGlobj )) .
Apparently, the user’s usage in non-local markets (the
second type of demand) does not affect his choice of
service in the local market (the first type of demand). To
study a local user’s local service choice, we can simply
compare his optimal local payoff if using global WiFi,
vGlob = Gi(θ ln(1 + kd
∗(θ, pGlobi ))− pGlobi d∗(θ, pGlobi ))
to the optimal payoff if subscribing to the provider i,
vi = Giθ ln(1 + k)− P ∗i .
Fig. 6. Local users’ usage in market i with a low global
WiFi price. All usage are with the global WiFi.
Fig. 7. Local users’ service choices in market i in the
medium global WiFi price regime.
In the following, we analyze the local users’ equilibrium
behaviors given any possible value of pGlobi .
6 To facilitate
analysis in this section, we assume the elasticity param-
eter of demand k = 1 and utility u(θ, d) = θ ln(1 + d).
Similar to Sections 2, 3 and 4, our results here can be
extended to the case with any positive k value.
Proposition 3: At Stage II, local users’ equilibrium de-
cisions in market i depend on the global WiFi price pGlobi
as follows:
• Low price regime (pGlobi ≤ ln(2)/2): no local users
will choose provider i’s local service. Users with
types θ ∈ [pGlobi , 1] will choose global WiFi. Their
equilibrium usage levels are illustrated in Fig. 6.7
• Medium price regime (ln(2)/2 < pGlobi ≤ 1/2): both
local provider i and the global provider have posi-
tive numbers of local subscribers. Figure 7 illustrates
local users’ service subscriptions, where there are
three categories of users depending on their valu-
ations: (i) a user with the type θ ∈ [0, pGlobi ) will
not choose any service, (ii) a user with the type
θ ∈ [pGlobi , θthi ) will choose global WiFi, and (iii)
a user with the type θ ∈ [θthi , 1] will choose local
provider i’s service. The threshold type θthi is the
unique solution to
θthi ln
(
θthi
pGlobi
)
− θthi + pGlobi −
(
θthi −
1
2
)
ln(2) = 0,
(26)
which satisfies θthi < 2p
Glob
i (i.e., d
∗(θthi , p
Glob
i ) < 1),
and θthi is decreasing in p
Glob
i . Provider i’s local ser-
vice targets at high-valuation users, whereas global
WiFi targets at low-valuation users and none of
global WiFi subscribers request maximum usage
level.
• High price regime (pGlobi > 1/2): no local users will
choose global WiFi. Users with types θ ∈ [1/2, 1]
choose Provider i’s service as in Fig. 4.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in Appendix A. We
also provide all appendices in [?]. Note the thresholds
ln(2)/2 and 1/2 identify whether the global WiFi price is
low enough to attract all local users or high enough to
6. Note that the revenue sharing decision η in Stage I does not affect
users’ decisions in Stage II.
7. The result in Fig. 6 is consistent with Fig. 1, as here we set k = 1.
9Fig. 8. Travelers’ usage choices in market i in global WiFi
in the medium price regime
attract no local users, respectively. Both thresholds are
less than 1 as they cannot exceed the maximum user
type θ = 1. Proposition 3 shows that two services will
coexist only in the medium global WiFi price regime,
when the two prices are comparable to each other. When
pGlobi decreases in this regime, more local users will
switch from the local provider i to global WiFi, resulting
in a larger partition threshold θthi . Moreover, θ
th
i only
depends on pGlobi and is independent of WiFi coverage
Gi, as both services compete with each other using the
same network infrastructure.
6.2 Stage I: Negotiation Between Global and Local
Providers
As the low and high price regimes in Proposition 3 will
drive either local provider i or the global provider out of
the local market, they are not likely to be viable choices
for the negotiation in Stage I. In fact, we can prove that
the medium price regime is the only practical choice for
the whole game equilibrium.
Theorem 2: In Stage I, the global provider and local
provider i will only agree on a global WiFi price in the
medium price regime (i.e., ln(2)/2 < pGlobi ≤ 1/2) as long
as the local user number is nontrivial compared to the
traveler number from other markets.8
The proof Theorem 2 is given in Appendix B. Next
we focus on the medium price regime and study the
revenues for both the global provider and Provider i.
First consider the global provider, who gains revenue
by serving both local users and travelers in market i, but
needs to share ηi portion of his revenue from market i to
local provider i for using the local WiFi infrastructure.
Global WiFi’s revenue from other markets is not related
to local provider i, and can be normalized to 0 in the
following analysis. By serving local users with types θ ∈
[pGlobi , θ
th
i ), the global provider collects a total payment
∆piGlobi (ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i )
= (1− ηi)pGlobi NiGi
∫ θthi
pGlob
i
d∗(θ, pGlobi )dθ. (28)
8. We rule out the extreme case where the local user number is trivial
compared to the traveler number (i.e., Ni/
(∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj
)
→ 0), in
which case the global provider will become the monopolist in market i
with the monopoly price of 1/3 (in the low price regime) and serve the
travelers only. It is clear that in the majority of markets the number of
local users should be much larger (at least comparable) to the traveler
number. Actually, a small number of local users cannot compensate
the initial deployment cost of a large-scale WiFi network and does not
allow the existence of a local provider in the first place (before the
global provider’s entry). However, for the purpose of completeness,
we still provide the analysis for this extreme case in Appendix B.
with d∗(θ, pGlobi ) = θ/p
Glob
i − 1. As for travelers in
market i, they can be divided into three categories de-
pending on their valuations (and independent of where
they come from) as in Fig. 8: (i) travelers with types
θ ∈ [0, pGlobi ) demand zero usage, (ii) travelers with
types θ ∈ [pGlobi , 2pGlobi ) demand partial usage, and
(iii) travelers with types θ ∈ [2pGlobi , 1] demand the
maximum usage. Similar to (5), we can derive that the
total payment collected by the global provider from the
travelers in market i as
∆piGlob−i (ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i ) =(1− ηi)
∑
j 6=i
αijNjGip
Glob
i
·
(∫ 2pGlobi
pGlob
i
(
θ
pGlobi
− 1
)
dθ +
∫ 1
2pGlob
i
1dθ
)
. (29)
By summing up (28) and (29), the global provider’s
revenue increase (comparing with the zero revenue if he
does not cooperate) by cooperating with local provider
i is
∆piGlob(ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i ) =(1− ηi)NiGi
(θthi − pGlobi )2
2
+ (1− ηi)
∑
j 6=i
αijNjGi
(
pGlobi −
3(pGlobi )
2
2
)
, (30)
which linearly decreases in the revenue sharing portion
ηi and increases in the number of travelers
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj
from the other markets. Notice that the number of travel-
ers in market i is fixed, and (30) is independent of other
local markets’ operations.9 Thus we can decompose the
interactions between different local markets, and study
each of them separately. Note that a local provider’s
revenue and the global provider’s local revenue are
still dependent on the number of travelers from other
markets.
Now we look at the revenue increase of local provider
i through the cooperation. As the global provider’s entry
will result in service competition, provider i will lose
those users with types θ ∈ [1/2, θthi ] to global WiFi.
Compared with provider i’s original revenue in (17) with
k = 1, such competition reduces the revenue by
∆piii(ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i ) = −
ln(2)
2
GiNi
(
θthi −
1
2
)
< 0.
On the other hand, the global provider will share part
of his revenue with local provider i:
∆pii−i(ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i ) =
ηi
1− ηi∆pi
Glob(ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i ).
9. At the equilibrium, each local provider will join the collaboration
with the global provider and realize a win-win situation. Thus we can
study each market individually by presuming the global provider’s
collaborations with all other providers.
10
η∗i (p
Glob
i ) = min

1,
ln(2)
4
Ni
(
θthi (p
Glob
i )−
1
2
)
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj
(
pGlobi −
3(pGlob
i
)2
2
)
+Ni
(θth
i
(pGlob
i
)−pGlob
i
)2
2
+ max


ln(2)
4
Ni
(
θthi (p
Glob
i )−
1
2
)
∑
j 6=i α
i
j
Nj
(
pGlob
i
−
3(pGlob
i
)2
2
)
+Ni
(θth
i
(pGlob
i
)−pGlob
i
)2
2
,
1
2



 , (27)
100 200 300 400
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.38
0.39
0.4
Σj≠i αj
i
 Nj
Eq
ui
lib
riu
m
 lo
ca
l p
ric
e 
of
 G
lo
ba
l W
iF
i  
p iG
lo
b*
 
 
Ni=100
Ni=200
Ni=300
Fig. 9. Equilibrium price of global
WiFi pGlob∗i in market i
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Fig. 10. Sharing portion η∗i between
Provider i and the global provider
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Fig. 11. Provider i’s normalized equi-
librium revenue increase by Gi.
Thus local provider i’s total revenue increase is
∆pii(ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i )
= ∆piii(ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i ) + ∆pi
i
−i(ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i )
= − ln(2)
2
GiNi
(
θthi −
1
2
)
+ ηiGi
×

Ni (θthi − pGlobi )2
2
+
∑
j 6=i
αijNj
(
pGlobi −
3(pGlobi )
2
2
) ,
(31)
which linearly increases in ηi and
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj .
Now we discuss how the global provider bargains
with local provider i on pGlobi and ηi based on (30)
and (31). We will use the Nash bargaining framework
to resolve this issue. According to [24], the Nash bar-
gaining equilibrium is Pareto efficient, symmetric, and
independent of irrelevant alternatives. It is the same
as Zeuthen’s solution of a general bargaining problem
where two players could bargain for infinite rounds. In
our problem, the Nash bargaining leads to the follow-
ing joint optimization problem of the revenue increase
product,10
max
ηi,p
Glob
i
,θth
i
∆piGlob(ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i )∆pi
i(ηi, p
Glob
i , θ
th
i )
subject to, 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1,
ln(2)
2
≤ pGlobi ≤
1
2
,
θthi ln
(
θthi
pGlobi
)
− θthi + pGlobi −
(
θthi −
1
2
)
ln(2) = 0,
(32)
where the last constraint comes from (26). Notice that
θthi only depends on p
Glob
i , and thus we can express
it as θthi (p
Glob
i ). This means that we need to solve the
remaining two variables ηi and pGlobi in Problem (32).
We can take a sequential optimization approach: first
optimize over ηi given a fixed pGlobi , and then optimize
over pGlobi . We can show that the objective function of
Problem (32) is strictly concave in ηi, which leads to the
following result.
Proposition 4: At the equilibrium, the global provider
shares the majority of his revenue in market i with local
provider i, i.e., η∗i > 1/2. More specifically, given any
feasible price ln(2)/2 < pGlobi < 1/2, the unique optimal
η∗i (p
Glob
i ) is given in (27), which increases in the local user
population Ni and decreases in the traveler population∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj from other markets to market i.
It is interesting to observe that the global provider
always needs to give away more than half of his revenue
to the local provider in order to provide enough incen-
tives for cooperation. As the local user population Ni
10. We can add different weights to each term in the product to
reflect different market powers of the global provider and provider i,
but this will not change the key insights of this paper.
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increases, the negative impact of competition increases,
hence the global provider needs to give away more
revenue. On the other hand, as more travelers coming,
the relative importance of the local market decreases,
and hence the global provider can keep more revenue
(but still less than half).
With (27), we can simplify Problem (32) into the
following one variable optimization problem:
max
pGlob
i
∆piGlob
(
η∗i (p
Glob
i ), p
Glob
i , θ
th
i (p
Glob
i )
)
·∆pii (η∗i (pGlobi ), pGlobi , θthi (pGlobi ))
subject to,
ln(2)
2
≤ pGlobi ≤
1
2
, (33)
where η∗i (p
Glob
i ) is given in (27) and θ
th
i (p
Glob
i ) (though
not in closed-form) can be derived from (26). We can
check that the objective of Problem (33) may not be
concave in pGlobi and Problem (33) is not a convex
optimization problem. Despite this, we can still use an
efficient one-dimensional exhaustive search algorithm
to find the global optimal solution pGlob∗i [32].
11 Next
we highlight some key observations of the solutions to
Problem (33).
Observation 1: At the equilibrium of market i, both the
global WiFi price pGlob∗i and revenue sharing portion η
∗
i
are independent of the local WiFi coverage Gi.12 As the
local user population Ni decreases or the traveler popu-
lation
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj increases, both p
Glob∗
i and η
∗
i decrease
(see Figs. 9 and 10).
Note that the global provider is the monopolist for
travelers, whereas both the global provider and provider
i are competing in serving local users. Compared to the
monopoly usage-based price 1/3 in (10) with k = 1,
the price of global WiFi pGlob∗i needs to be higher than
1/3 to avoid severe price competition with provider i’s
local flat-rate pricing service. When the traveler pop-
ulation
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj increases or local user population
Ni decreases, the global provider is gaining a market
power approaching a monopolist in serving the whole
market, and it is efficient for the global provider to
lower the price (and eventually approach the monopoly
benchmark of 1/3 as shown in Fig. 9). Meanwhile, local
provider i’s loss of revenue due to the global provider’s
competition is smaller, and the global provider only
needs to share a smaller portion η∗i with provider i as
shown in Fig. 10.
Observation 2: The equilibrium revenue increases of
both provider i and the global provider,∆piGlob and∆pii,
11. Here is an algorithm to solve Problem (33). We first approximate
the continuous feasible range [ln(2)/2, 1/2] of pGlobi through a proper
discretization with gap ∆, i.e., representing all possibilities by 1−ln(2)
2∆
equally spaced values (with the first and last values equal to ln(2)/2
and 1/2, respectively). By comparing their corresponding objective
values, we then determine pGlob∗i . The overall computation complexity
is O(
1−ln(2)
2∆
). In practice, the global provider will not change pGlob∗i
frequently, and there is no need to solve Problem (33) often.
12. As both ∆piGlob in (30) and ∆pii in (31) are linear in Gi, and θthi
is independent of Gi according to (26), the objective of Problem (33)
can be normalized over G2i . Thus the optimal solutions p
Glob∗
i and η
∗
i
to the problem are also independent of Gi.
are increasing in
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj and Gi, but are decreasing
in Ni (see Fig. 11).
Intuitively, a larger coverage Gi improves the quality
of both two services, and a larger
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj provides
a larger cooperation benefit between the global provider
and local provider i. However, a larger population Ni
increases the competition between the global and local
providers and thus reduces the cooperation benefit.
7 IMPACT OF LOCAL MARKET COMPETITION
In previous sections, we have assumed that there is a
single local provider in each local market, as very few
providers can afford the very high cost to deploy a large
scale WiFi network. In this section, we relax this assump-
tion and consider two competitive providers 1 and 2 in
a local market i ∈ I.13 We would like to understand
how local competition affects local providers’ pricing
strategies and the global provider’s entry into the local
market.
7.1 Duopoly competition in WiFi pricing
Let us denote the two local providers’ WiFi coverages as
Gi,1 and Gi,2, and we can assume Gi,1 ≥ Gi,2 without
loss of generality. If a provider j(= 1, 2) announces
a flat-fee price Pi,j ,14 then a type-θ user’s payoff by
choosing provider j is
vi,j(θ) = θGi,j ln(2)− Pi,j , j = 1, 2.
The user will choose the provider that offers a larger
payoff:
j∗(θ) = arg max
j=1,2
vi,j(θ). (34)
If payoffs obtained from both providers are the same,
the user will randomly choose one provider with a
probability of 1/2.
Given users’ preferences, two providers will optimize
their prices in order to achieve an equilibrium, where
each provider is maximizing his revenue given the price
of the other provider. Next we will characterize the
equilibrium flat-fee prices.
We first consider the symmetric case Gi,1 = Gi,2. By
showing that each provider wants to reduce his price to
be lower than his competitor and any reasonable price
should be non-negative, we have the following result.
Proposition 5: Given a symmetric WiFi coverage Gi,1 =
Gi,2, the unique equilibrium flat-rate prices are P ∗i,1 =
P ∗i,2 = 0.
13. As the general case of oligopoly (which involves more than
two local providers in the same local market) is quite challenging
to analyze, we focus on the case of duopoly which already provides
significant engineering insights for our problem.
14. Another possible scenario can be that one provider uses flat-rate
pricing and the other provider uses usage-based one, as at least one
provider wants to use the efficient flat-rate pricing. This scenario can be
analyzed in a similar way as the local competition between the global
provider and a provider in Section 6, hence we skip the details here.
In practice, we observe flat-rate pricing in most competition markets,
as the usage-based pricing is complex and costly to manage.
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Fig. 13. Local users’ equilibrium choices between
providers 1 and 2 in market i
Proposition 5 is the same as the non-profitable pricing
equilibrium in the classic Bertrand model of perfect com-
petition [28]. At the equilibrium, all users will subscribe
to the WiFi service, and the total demand in the market
is equally shared by the two providers. A type-θ user
obtains a payoff of θGi2 ln(2) > 0, and each provider
obtains a payoff of 0.
Next we consider the asymmetric case Gi,1 > Gi,2.
Lemma 1: Given an asymmetric WiFi coverage Gi,1 >
Gi,2, the equilibrium prices (Pi,1, Pi,2) satisfy
0 <
Pi,2
Gi,2 ln(2)
<
Pi,1
Gi,1 ln(2)
<
Pi,1 − Pi,2
(Gi,1 −Gi,2) ln(2) < 1,
(35)
and the local users’ subscriptions are shown in Fig. 12.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix C. Using
Lemma 1, we can derive two providers’ revenues:
pii,1(Pi,1, Pi,2) = Pi,1Ni
(
1− Pi,1 − Pi,2
(Gi,1 −Gi,2) ln(2)
)
, (36)
and
pii,2(Pi,1, Pi,2) = Pi,2Ni
(
Pi,1 − Pi,2
(Gi,1 −Gi,2) ln(2) −
Pi,2
Gi,2 ln(2)
)
.
(37)
We can show that both pii,1(Pi,1, Pi,2) in (36) and
pii,2(Pi,1, Pi,2) in (37) are jointly concave in Pi,1 and Pi,2.
By checking the first-order conditions, we can derive
each provider’s best response price (i.e., the price that
maximizes his revenue given his competitor’s price), i.e.,
P ∗i,1(Pi,2) =
(Gi,1 −Gi,2) ln(2)
2
+
Pi,2
2
, (38)
and
P ∗i,2(Pi,1) =
Gi,2
2Gi,1
Pi,1. (39)
By solving (38) and (39) simultaneously, we obtain the
unique pricing equilibrium as follows.
Theorem 3: Given an asymmetric WiFi coverage Gi,1 >
Gi,2, the unique equilibrium flat-rate prices are
P ∗i,1 =
2 ln(2)Gi,1(Gi,1 −Gi,2)
4Gi,1 −Gi,2 , (40)
and
P ∗i,2 =
ln(2)Gi,2(Gi,1 −Gi,2)
4Gi,1 −Gi,2 . (41)
Both equilibrium prices are lower than the monopoly
price (Gi,1 +Gi,2) ln(2)/2 in (16), if we assume that
the monopolist has a coverage of Gi,1 + Gi,2.15 In the
monopoly equilibrium, a monopolist with the optimal
flat-rate pricing can only serve 50% of users (see Fig. 4);
in the duopoly case here, however, the two competitive
providers together serve more than 75% of users, and
provider 1 alone serves more than 50% of users (see
Fig. 13).
Intuitively, the local market competition significantly
drives the market price down and attracts more users.
Under asymmetric service qualities (represented by cov-
erages), two providers can still differentiate their prices
to cater to different groups of users and make profits.
However, under a symmetric service quality, the severe
competition will bring their profits down to zero.16
It should be pointed out that though we only look
at duopoly case, the analysis in this subsection can be
extended to oligopoly case. For example, by showing
that each provider with identical coverage will reduce
price to be lower than his competitors, we have the same
result about non-profitable pricing as in Proposition 5.
Like Lemma 1 and Theorem 3, we can also show that
providers with different coverages will differentiate and
segment the market. More providers will further lower
the equilibrium prices (below monopoly price).
7.2 Impact of Local Competition on Global WiFi
Now we discuss the entry of the global provider into a
competitive market i with two providers, and evaluate
the impact of competition on the global provider’s entry.
We will also consider the local monopoly benchmark, where
a monopoly local provider has a coverage of Gi,1 +Gi,2,
in which case the global provider’s decision has been
discussed in Section 6 by assuming Gi = Gi,1+Gi,2. Since
any existing local provider’s coverage is relatively small
and their WiFi hotspots are often deployed at different
locations, we assume the aggregate coverage Gi ≤ 1.
To analytically characterize the pricing decisions with
the global provider’s market entry and the impact of
local competition, we focus on the symmetric cover-
age setting, i.e., providers 1 and 2 each covers Gi/2.17
According to Proposition 5, all users are served by
providers 1 and 2 at the same zero price before the global
provider enters. Such a competition has the following
15. One can also show that the two competitive prices are still lower
than the monopoly price even if the monopolist only covers Gi,1.
16. We want to remind the readers that the zero profit result can
be best understood qualitatively (i.e., the profits are very small), as our
model does not capture all factors that may affect the providers’ profits
in a real market. In fact, most analytical results in this paper should
be understood similarly.
17. The asymmetric coverage setting can be analyzed in a similar
way. Compared to symmetric coverage case, in this case, price com-
petition mitigates (with non-zero prices in Theroem 3) and the global
provider’s price should be higher (compared to Theorem 4). Different
from Theorem 5, The global provider will also decide different rev-
enue sharing portions with the two differentiated providers. One can
view the asymmetric coverage case as a partial competition scenario
between the monopoly in Section 6 (without competition) and perfect
competition in Section 7.2.
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positive and negative impacts on the global provider’s
market entry:
• Integration of WiFi coverage (see Theorem 4): By in-
tegrating the local providers’ WiFi networks, the
global provider is able to provide the best service
quality in terms of WiFi coverage, which is impor-
tant to high-valuation users.
• Larger bargaining power (see Theorem 5): As local
providers’ equilibrium revenues are zero, they are
more willing to collaborate with the global provider.
This means that the global provider may share less
revenue with each of the local provider.
• Severe price competition (see Theorem 4): The zero
local WiFi price and full user subscription make it
difficult for the global provider to charge a high
price to the local users.
By using backward induction, we have the following
result about the global provider’s equilibrium usage-
based pricing decision in Stage I (by considering users’
responses in Stage II).
Theorem 4: At the market entry equilibrium with two
symmetric coverage local providers, the global WiFi
usage-based price is always in the low price regime (i.e.,
pGlobi ≤ ln(2)/2), which is less than the price in the local
monopoly benchmark (see Theorem 2 in Section 6.2). All
local users with a θ ∈ [2pGlobi / ln(2), 1] will use the global
WiFi service and demand the full usage level.
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix D. Even
with a lower price comparing to the local monopoly
benchmark, the global provider can still make a profit
by providing a better WiFi service in doubling local WiFi
coverage and attract high-end users.
Next we derive the revenues for the global provider
and both local providers. To serve local users and trav-
elers, the global provider needs to share ηi,j ∈ (0, 1) to
provider j ∈ {1, 2}. Due to the symmetric WiFi coverage,
we will focus on the symmetric sharing case where ηi,1 =
ηi,2 = ηi. Recall from Theorem 4 that the global provider
will serve local users with θ ∈ [2pGlobi / ln(2), 1]. Similar
to (30), (31), and the global market decomposition in
Section 6.2, we can derive the revenue increases of the
global provider and local provider j ∈ {1, 2} in market
i as the summation of revenue increases in serving local
users and travelers, i.e.,
∆piGlob(ηi, p
Glob
i ) = (1− 2ηi)GipGlobi
·
(
Ni
(
1− 2p
Glob
i
ln(2)
)
+
∑
m 6=i
αimNm
(
1− 3p
Glob
i
2
))
, (42)
and for j ∈ {1, 2}
∆pii,j(ηi, p
Glob
i ) = ηiGip
Glob
i
·
(
Ni
(
1− 2p
Glob
i
ln(2)
)
+
∑
m 6=i
αimNm
(
1− 3p
Glob
i
2
))
. (43)
Notice that both the global provider and the two local
providers’ revenue increases are increasing in the num-
ber of travelers from other markets
∑
m 6=i α
i
mNm. Ac-
cording to [33], the generalized Nash (group) bargaining
in market i involving three parties can be formulated as
the following joint optimization problem:
max
ηi,p
Glob
i
∆piGlob∆pii,1∆pii,2,
subject to, 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1,
0 ≤ pGlobi ≤ ln(2)/2. (44)
This above problem formulation assumes that the global
provider and the two local providers would engage in
the bargaining simultaneously. In [?], we also show that
all the results derived from solving Problem (44) still
hold even when the global provider bargains with each
provider individually and simultaneously.
Notice that the objective function in Problem (44) can
be rewritten as
∆piGlob∆pii,1∆pii,2 = η2i (1− 2ηi)
(
Gip
Glob
i
·
(
Ni
(
1− 2p
Glob
i
ln(2)
)
+
∑
m 6=i
αimNm
(
1− 3p
Glob
i
2
)))3
,
which is quasi-concave in ηi, as it is increasing in ηi ∈
[0, 1/3) and decreasing in ηi ∈ (1/3, 1] for any fixed value
of pGlobi . Then we have the following result.
Theorem 5: At the market entry equilibrium with two
symmetric coverage local providers, the global provider
equally shares the revenue among the two providers and
himself (i.e., η∗i = 1/3).
Recall that in a monopoly local market, the global
provider needs to give up most of his revenue to the
monopoly local provider, in order to compensate the
local provider’s loss of market share and revenue due
to the global provider’s competition (see Proposition 4).
However, with severe competition, the two operators’
revenues are already zero and cannot be further re-
duced after the global provider’s entry. Hence the global
provider can decide a smaller revenue sharing ratio with
each of the local provider. However, the total revenue
ratio shared by the global provider to both providers
(2η∗i = 2/3) can be larger than the revenue sharing in
the local monopoly benchmark (see Fig. 10).
After determining η∗i = 1/3, Problem (44) becomes a
single-variable optimization problem and can be easily
solved through an efficient one-dimensional exhaustive
search algorithm. Next we provide some interesting
numerical results.
Observation 3: The equilibrium revenue increases of
the global provider and the local providers are increas-
ing in Gi, Ni and
∑
m 6=i α
i
mNm (see Fig. 14 for the
global provider’s case). Compared to the local monopoly
benchmark, the global provider obtains a larger rev-
enue increase in the competition case when there are
a large number of local users Ni (hence there are a
lot of high-valuation users to attract), e.g., Ni ≥ 500
when
∑
m 6=i α
i
mNm = 400. Such a benefit diminishes
when there are more travelers, e.g., the threshold of Ni
increases from 500 to 700 when
∑
m 6=i α
i
mNm changes
from 400 to 600, meaning fewer travelers allow the
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creases in monopoly and competition local markets as
a function of traveler population
∑
m 6=i α
i
mNm and local
user population Ni.
global provider to better “exploit” the benefit of local
competition.
Intuitively, the local competition enables the global
provider to easily enter and dominate the market in-
cluding local users; however, the global provider can
only charge a low price due to local competition and
he also needs to share revenue with more providers.
Compared to monopoly scenario, the global provider’s
revenue may decrease when local user number does not
dominate traveler number.
Note that the analysis in this subsection can be
extended to oligopoly case, by considering M local
providers in market i with identical coverage Gi/M .
We can still show the low price regime holds for the
global WiFi service, as in Theorem 4. Following this,
the Nash bargaining in (44) extends to have M rather
than 2 local revenue increases in the objective, where
the global provider shares ηi revenue with each provider
and leaves 1 −Mηi protion for himself. Similar to The-
orem 5, the bargaining outcome is η∗i = 1/(M + 1).
8 CONCLUSION
Our study in this paper is motivated by the different
pricing practices of local WiFi providers such as AT&T
in USA and PCCW in Hong Kong as well as a new kind
of global WiFi provider represented by Skype WiFi. We
first show that in a local market, given abundant WiFi
capacity, flat-rate pricing leads to higher revenue for a lo-
cal provider than usage-based pricing. We further study
how a global WiFi provider (e.g., Skype) cooperates with
many local providers in using their WiFi infrastructures
to provide a global WiFi service. We explain why the
global provider adopts usage-based pricing and gives
away the majority of his revenue to the local provider.
There are some possible directions to extend our re-
sults. First, we can consider a user’s traffic model is
inelastic rather than elastic in the current model. For ex-
ample, we can use a Sigmoid function to model a user’s
utility in using video conferencing, and the analysis will
be more complicated. Second, this paper focuses on the
steady state about users’ service choices, and it is also
interesting to study users’ dynamics in network selection
during the adoption process (as in [34], [35]). Third, we
can further investigate the cellular data servcies’ possible
competition with local WiFi services. For example, we
can introduce a reservation payoff for each user, and
a user will choose the WiFi service only if his payoff
is larger than this reservation payoff. Our main results
should hold, and a larger reservation payoff encourages
the WiFi provider to charge a smaller WiFi price to attract
the subscribers. Finally, one may study how the network
congestion affects the competition between two local
providers. Different from Section 7.1, we believe that the
congestion can help differentiate the service qualities of
different providers, and even with the same coverage, it
is unlikely to result in current non-profitable outcome (as
in Proposition 5). One provider caters to the high-type
users while the other covers many low-type users.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The proof consists three parts for three price regimes.
A.1 The Low Price Regime pGlobi ≤ ln(2)/2
In this regime, from the global provider’s local users
with types θ ∈ [pGlobi , 2pGlobi ) will demand partial us-
age levels (i.e., d∗(θ, pGlobi ) < 1) and users with types
θ ∈ [2pGlobi , 1] will demand the full usage level (i.e.,
d∗(θ, pGlobi ) = 1).
Next we show that no user will choose the local
provider i’s service i this regime. We can classify local
users into three classes based on θ.
• Local users with θ ∈ [pGlobi , 1/2]: these users will ob-
tain non-positive payoffs (out of service) if choosing
local provider i, but can obtain positive payoffs by
choosing global WiFi.
• Local users with θ ∈ [1/2, 2pGlobi ): a user can obtain
the following maximum payoff if choosing global
WiFi,
ui(θ, p
Glob
i , d
∗(θ, pGlobi ))
= Gi
(
θ ln
(
θ
pGlobi
)
− θ + pGlobi
)
.
The same user’s maximum payoff if choosing the
local provider i is
ui(θ, P
∗
i , 1) = Gi
(
θ ln(2)− ln(2)
2
)
.
The payoff improvement of switching to global WiFi
∆ui(θ, p
Glob
i ) =Gi
(
θ ln
(
θ
pGlobi
)
− θ + pGlobi
−
(
θ − 1
2
)
ln(2)
)
. (45)
Since θ < 2pGlobi , hence
∂∆ui(θ, p
Glob
i )
∂θ
= Gi ln
(
θ
2pGlobi
)
< 0,
which shows the monotonicity of ∆ui(θ, pGlobi ) in
θ. Additionally, we can show ∆ui(1/2, pGlobi ) > 0
and ∆ui(2pGlobi , p
Glob
i ) ≥ 0. Thus we conclude that
all users with types θ ∈ [1/2, 2pGlobi ) benefit from
switching from provider i’s service to the global
WiFi.
• Local users with θ ∈ [2pGlobi , 1]: these users demand a
full usage level with the global WiFi. A type-θ user’s
optimal payoff if choosing global WiFi is
ui(θ, p
Glob
i , 1) = Gi(θ ln(2)− pGlobi ),
which is larger than ui(θ, P ∗i , 1) due to p
Glob
i <
ln(2)/2. Thus these users are better off by choosing
global WiFi.
This complete the proof for the low price regime.
A.2 Medium Price Regime ln(2)/2 < pGlobi < 1/2
By checking (45), the highest type (i.e., θ = 1) user will
stay with provider i’s service due to pGlobi > ln(2)/2, and
at least users with types θ ∈ [pGlobi , 1/2) will subscribe to
global WiFi. Due to the continuity of θ, we can show that
there exists a partition threshold θthi , where the type-θ
th
i
user is indifferent in choosing between the two services.
Notice that if a type-θthi user chooses global WiFi, he
will demand only a partial usage, which means θthi <
2pGlobi . Assume that this is not the case, then we will
have ui(θthi , p
Glob
i , 1) = ui(θ
th
i , P
∗
i , 1), i.e.,
Gi(θ
th
i ln(2)− pGlobi ) = Gi(θthi ln(2)−
ln(2)
2
),
which violates the assumption pGlobi > ln(2)/2 in this
medium price regime. Thus any user with type θ ∈
[pGlobi , θ
th
i ) will demand partial usage levels in global
WiFi, and we have ∆ui(θthi , p
Glob
i ) = 0 which results in
(26). Since 2pGlobi > θ
th
i , we have
∂∆ui(θ
th
i , p
Glob
i )
∂θthi
= Gi ln
(
θthi
2pGlobi
)
< 0,
and thus the solution to (26) is unique.
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Next we examine the relationship between θthi and
pGlobi , which are the only two variables in (26). By
checking
∂∆ui(θ
th
i , p
Glob
i )
∂pGlobi
= g(Mi, B)
(
− 1
pGlobi
+ 1
)
,
we have the following relationship by using the implicit
function theorem,
dθthi
dpGlobi
= −∂∆ui(θ
th
i , p
Glob
i )/∂p
Glob
i
∂∆ui(θthi , p
Glob
i )/∂θ
th
i
=
1
pGlob
i
− 1
ln
(
θth
i
2pGlob
i
) < 0,
(46)
which shows θthi is decreasing in price p
Glob
i . The intu-
ition is that as the price increases, fewer users will switch
from provider i’s service to global WiFi, the threshold
θthi decreases, and the subscriber number of global WiFi
decreases.
A.3 High Price Regime pGlobi > 1/2
In this regime, local users with types θ ∈ [1/2, pGlobi )
will receive negative payoffs by switching to global
WiFi, hence they will stay with provider i’s and receive
positive payoffs.
Next we prove that no local users with types θ ∈
[pGlobi , 1] will switch to global WiFi. The high price
pGlobi > 1/2 can only attract those users with types
θ > pGlobi , and even the highest type (i.e., θ = 1) user
will not request full usage level (i.e., d∗(1, pGlobi ) < 1).
A type θ>pGlobi user’s payoff improvement ∆ui(θ, p
Glob
i )
by switching to global WiFi is given in (45). Since
∆ui(θ, p
Glob
i )|θ=pGlobi = −
(
pGlobi −
1
2
)
ln(2) < 0,
and
∂∆ui(θ, p
Glob
i )
∂θ
= ln
(
θ
2pGlobi
)
< ln (θ) ≤ 0
due to pGlobi > 1/2 and θ ≤ 1, we conclude that the
payoff improvements of all users with types θ ∈ [pGlobi , 1]
are negative by switching to global WiFi. Thus they will
stay with provider i’s service. Global WiFi has no users
locally.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove Theorem 2, we will first analyze the equilib-
rium of Stage I in high and low price regimes. Then we
will compare it to the medium price regime, and show
that both provider i and the global provider prefer the
equilibrium in the medium price regime.
B.1 Equilibrium Analysis of Stage I in the High Price
Regime
In the high price regime (i.e., pGlobi > 1/2), provider i
is the monopolist to serve local users and the global
provider is the monopolist to serve travelers in market
i. Due to the high global WiFi price, all travelers will
demand partial usage levels are in Fig. 2, and only
travelers with types θ > pGlobi will subscribe to global
WiFi. A type-θ > pGlobi traveler’s demand is θ/p
Glob
i − 1.
Similar to the derivation of (8) in the high price regime
in Section 2, we can show that the global provider’s
revenue increment is
∆piGlob(ηi, p
Glob
i ) =(1− ηi)
∑
j 6=i
Njα
i
jGip
Glob
i
×
∫ 1
pGlob
i
(
θ
pGlobi
− 1
)
dθ, (47)
and its first partial derivative of pGlobi is
∂∆piGlob(ηi, p
Glob
i )
∂pGlobi
= (1− ηi)
∑
j 6=i
Njα
i
jGi(p
Glob
i − 1) < 0.
Thus the global provider wants to decrease his price to
the lowerbound 1/2 of the high price regime to increase
his revenue increment. Meanwhile, provider i’s revenue
increment is
∆pii(ηi, p
Glob
i ) =
ln(2)
4
NiGi + ηi
∑
j 6=i
Njα
i
jGip
Glob
i
×
∫ 1
pGlob
i
(
θ
pGlobi
− 1
)
dθ, (48)
which is also decreasing in pGlobi . Thus both the global
provider and provider i will agree on the price of pGlobi =
1/2 is achieved at the Nash bargaining.
However, price 1/2 is just a special case of the medium
price regime, and it cannot outperform the equilibrium
price in medium price regime.
B.2 Equilibrium Analysis of Stage I in the Low Price
Regime
In the low price regime (i.e., pGlobi ≤ ln(2)/2), no users
choose provider i’s service and θthi = 1. By following
a similar analysis as in Section 6, we can derive the
revenue increment of the global provider as
∆piGlob(ηi, p
Glob
i ) =(1− ηi)Gi(Ni +
∑
j 6=i
αijNj)
× (pGlobi −
3
2
(pGlobi )
2), (49)
as the global provider is a monopolist in market i. The
revenue increment of provider i is
∆pii(ηi, p
Glob
i ) =Gi
(
− ln(2)
4
Ni + ηi(Ni +
∑
j 6=i
αijNj)
× (pGlobi −
3
2
(pGlobi )
2)
)
, (50)
17
who loses all of his original revenue after the global
provider’s entry and hence needs to be compensated by
the global provider in order to share the network. The
optimization problem to derive Nash bargaining is
max
ηi,p
Glob
i
∆piGlob(ηi, p
Glob
i )∆pi
i(ηi, p
Glob
i )
subject to, 0 < η < 1,
pGlobi ≤
ln(2)
2
. (51)
Notice that the two decision variables pGlobi and ηi are
not coupled with each other in the constraints of Prob-
lem (51), and both ∆piGlob(ηi, pGlobi ) and ∆pi
i(ηi, p
Glob
i )
are maximized at the monopoly usage-based price 1/3
(see (10) with k = 1). Thus the optimal pGlob∗i is 1/3
which is smaller than ln(2)/2.
Now we will maximize the product
∆piGlob(ηi, 1/3)∆pi
i(ηi, 1/3) by choosing ηi, which
can be shown concave in ηi. By checking its first order
condition, we can derive the optimal sharing ratio as
η∗i = max
(
3 ln(2)
2 Ni
Ni +
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj
,
1
2
+
3 ln(2)
4 Ni
Ni +
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj
)
,
(52)
which is larger than 1/2. This means that the global
provider needs to share the majority of his revenue
increment with provider i as in Proposition 4.
Finally, we can compare the maximum bargaining
objective ∆piGlob(η∗i , 1/3)∆pi
i(η∗i , 1/3) here to that in the
medium price regime (i.e., (33)). Figure 15 shows the
ratio of bargaining objectives between the low and
medium price regimes as a function of traveler number∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj and local user number Ni. The ratio is less
than 1 in most scenarios and is larger than 1 only when
Ni is not comparable to
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj (e.g., when Ni = 350
and
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj ≥ 900). Thus we can conclude that the
bargaining objective in medium price regime is larger
than that in low price regime, as long as we do not
face the extreme case where Ni is trivial compared to∑
j 6=i αjNj . This means that the optimal decision of p
Glob
i
in the medium price regime outperforms that in the low
price regime under the practical parameter setting.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Relationship (35) involves three thresholds of θ. A user
with θ = Pi,j
Gi,j ln(2)
is indifferent between not using the
WiFi service and subscribing to provider j’s service, if
provider j is the monopolist in the market. A user with
θ =
Pi,1−Pi,2
(Gi,1−Gi,2) ln(2)
is indifferent between subscribing to
any one of the two providers. These three thresholds
must lie in (0, 1) at the equilibrium, otherwise at least
one provider will have no subscribers and he will have
an incentive to lower his price.
Given three thresholds, there are a total of six possible
relationships in terms of their relative values. However,
we can show that Pi,1−Pi,2(Gi,1−Gi,2) ln(2) <
Pi,1
Gi,1 ln(2)
is equivalent
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Fig. 15. The ratio of revenue increment product between
low and medium price regimes as a function of traveler
number
∑
j 6=i α
i
jNj and local user number Ni.
to Pi,1
Gi,1 ln(2)
<
Pi,2
Gi,2 ln(2)
, hence either (35) or the following
is true:
Pi,1 − Pi,2
(Gi,1 −Gi,2) ln(2) <
Pi,1
Gi,1 ln(2)
<
Pi,2
Gi,2 ln(2)
. (53)
In (53), however, users with θ > Pi,1−Pi,2(Gi,1−Gi,2) ln(2) are only
interested in provider 1’s service, and provider 2 has
no subscribers. Hence provider 2 has an incentive to
decrease Pi,2 such that
Pi,1−Pi,2
(Gi,1−Gi,2) ln(2)
>
Pi,2
Gi,2 ln(2)
. Thus
(53) can not be true at the equilibrium. This proves the
Lemma.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We first show that no equilibrium exists in the high or
the medium price regime, and then discuss the low price
regime.
We first look at the high price regime (pGlobi > 1/2).
In this regime, a type-θ user’s payoff by choosing any
local provider’s service is θGi ln(2)/2, and his payoff by
choosing global WiFi is Gi(θ ln(θ/pGlobi )−θ+pGlobi ) (based
on (2) and (3)). Notice that a local user with a θ < pGlobi
will never choose the global WiFi , since in that case the
user’s demand will be zero according to (3). Hence we
only need to consider local users with θ ∈ [pGlobi , 1]. For
a user with θ ∈ [pGlobi , 1], he will only demand a partial
usage level and his payoff improvement by switching
from local WiFi to global WiFi is
∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) = Giθ
(
ln
(
θ
pGlobi
)
− 1 + p
Glob
i
θ
− ln(2)
2
)
.
(54)
The first partial derivative of (54) over θ is
∂∆vi(θ, pGlobi )
∂θ
= Gi ln
(
θ√
2pGlobi
)
,
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which is negative if θ ∈ [pGlobi ,
√
2pGlobi ), is zero if θ =√
2pGlobi , and is positive if θ ∈ (
√
2pGlobi , 1]. Thus (54)
reaches its minimum at θ =
√
2pGlobi , and reaches its
maximum either at θ = pGlobi or θ = 1. We can show that
∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) |θ=pGlob
i
= −GipGlobi ln(2)/2 < 0
and
∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) |θ=1
= Gi
(− ln(pGlobi )− 1 + pGlobi − ln(2)/2) < 0.
Hence ∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) < 0 for any θ ∈ [pGlobi , 1], and no
users will choose global WiFi in Stage II due to his high
price. This means that the global provider’s revenue is
zero, and he has an incentive to reduce his price in Stage
I to improve the revenue. Hence an equilibrium can not
exist in this high price regime.
Next we look at the medium price regime (ln(2)/2 <
pGlobi ≤ 1/2). For a type θ > pGlobi user, he may demand
a partial or full usage level and his payoff improvement
by switching from any local provider’s service to global
WiFi is
∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) =

Giθ
(
ln
(
θ
pGlob
i
)
− 1 + pGlobi
θ
− ln(2)2
)
, if θ
pGlob
i
∈ [1, 2),
Giθ
(
ln(2)
2 −
pGlobi
θ
)
, if θ ∈ [2pGlobi , 1].
(55)
Similar to our previous analysis in the high price regime,
we can show that ∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) in (55) is decreasing in
θ ∈ [pGlobi ,
√
2pGlobi ] and increasing in θ ∈ (
√
2pGlobi , 1].
Thus ∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) reaches its maximum at either θ =
pGlobi or θ = 1. By checking ∆v
i(θ, pGlobi ) |θ=pGlobi < 0
and ∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) |θ=1= Gi(ln(2)/2 − pGlobi ) < 0 in this
medium price regime, we conclude that ∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) <
0 for any θ ∈ [pGlobi , 1]. This means that the global
provider’s revenue is zero, and he has an incentive to
reduce his price in Stage I to improve the revenue. Hence
an equilibrium can not exist in this medium price regime.
Finally we are ready to examine users’ choices in the
low price regime (pGlobi ≤ ln(2)/2). The analysis of this
regime is similar to the previous two regimes, where we
will study how the payoff improvement ∆vi(θ, pGlobi )
changes with θ. We can show that ∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) |θ=1≥
0 (since pGlobi ≤ ln(2)/2), ∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) |θ=2pGlobi =
Gip
Glob
i (ln(2) − 1) < 0, and ∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) is strictly
increasing in θ ∈ [2pGlobi , 1], we conclude that there
exists a unique threshold θ˜th such that all users with
θ ∈ (θ˜th, 1] will choose global WiFi rather than any
local WiFi service. A user with θ = θ˜th is indifferent
in choosing any service since his payoff improvement is
zero (i.e., ∆vi(θ, pGlobi ) |θ=θ˜th= Gi(θ ln(2)/2− pGlobi ) = 0).
This means that θ˜th = 2p
Glob
i / ln(2). As θ˜th > 2p
Glob
i , the
local users who choose global WiFi will demand a full
usage level (i.e., d∗(θ, pGlobi ) = 1).
